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An issue that has vexed judicial and scholarly authors of tort law is the 
significance, if any, of assigning the victim's, or protagonist's, status as a 
child. Several rules in tort have manifest solicitude towards the victim's 
infant status, together with the presumptive childhood limitations upon 
dexterity and judgment. 
One such tort rule, applicable in a variety of instances to a land owner's 
or occupier's duties when the presence of children is predictable, recognizes 
that "[wlhere a duty of care is owed, the likelihood of the presence of 
children has great bearing on the decision whether or not conduct is 
reasonable."' Similarly, in matters of attractive nuisance, a heightened 
duty has been imposed upon a land owner or possessor who 
knows, or should know, that young children habitually frequent the vicinity 
of a . . .  dangerous agency existing on the land, which is likely to cause 
injury to them because they, by reason of their immaturity, are incapable 
of appreciating the risk involved, and where the expense or inconvenience 
of remedying the condition is slight compared to the risk to the children.' 
One court's expression of the amplified duty provides that "there is a 
duty upon the owner . . .  to remedy the condition or otherwise protect the 
children from injury . . .  ."' Elsewhere in tort doctrine, the Restatement 
(Second) of Torts recognizes, and makes special provisions for, the imrnatu- 
rity of children. Specifically, the Restatement provides that "[ilf the actor 
1. FOWLER V. HARPER ET AL., THE LAW OF TORTS $ 27.5, at 159 (2d ed. 1986) 
(citing Terranella v. Union Bldg. & Constr. Co., 70 A.2d 753, 756 (N.J. 1950) ("Where, as 
here, the obligation exists primarily in relation to groups of young children, that in itself is 
one of the concomitant circumstances to be weighed.")). 
2. Kahn v. James Burton Co., 126 N.E.2d 836, 842 (Ill. 1955). 
3. Id. Kahn is discussed in Dallas v. Granite City Steel Co., 21 1 N.E.2d 907 (Ill. 
App. Ct. 1965), in which the court states "the general rule that infants have no greater right 
than adults to go upon the land of others, and that their minority, of itself, imposes no burden 
on the occupier of land to expect them, or to prepare for their safety." 21 1 N.E.2d at 91 1. 
See also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS 8 339 (1965) (setting forth a rule for 
landowners' responsibilities for what is commonly called an attractive nuisance). 
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is a child, the standard of conduct to which he must conform to avoid being 
negligent is that of a reasonable person of like age, intelligence, and 
experience under like  circumstance^."^ A harmonious latitude is found in 
weighing a child's contributory negligence. The general rule for a child 
between the ages of seven and fourteen is that, though'the child "is required 
to exercise due care for his own safety under the circumstances[,] . . . the 
care required is to be measured 'by that ordinarily exercised under similar 
circumstances by children of the same age, knowledge, judgment, and 
experience. '"' 
Lamentably, notwithstanding these and other tort rules of either general 
or particular applicability, in other areas of tort law, including many 
products liability decisions, consideration of a child's inherent limitations in 
judgment and cognition is too often merely an afterthought. For example, 
in negligence theory, an actor's duty is defined as extending to those whom 
an adult of reasonable vigilance would perceive would be injured should the 
actor act without due care.' In matters of primary negligence, in which the 
objective reasonable person standard is used,' a child utilizing an "adult" 
mechanism is held, without regard to his or her age, judgment, or dexterity, 
to a standard of adult prudence.' 
4. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS 5 283A (1965). 
The First Restatement of Torts applied "a lower standard of care in cases involving the 
primary negligence of young children." McHale v. Watson, 115 C.L.R. 199, 207 (Austl. 
1966). RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS 5 283 (1965): 
(a) Children who are so young as to be manifestly incapable of exercising any of the 
qualities necessary to the perception of risk. This group would comprise babies and 
children of very tender years and instead of formulating a standard of care for them it 
suffices to say that they are incapable of negligence. 
@) Infants who, although they have not yet attained majority, are capable as adults 
of foreseeing the probable consequences of their actions. In view of the capabilities of 
this class the standard of care required of them is the same as that required of adults. 
(c) Children who come between the extremes indicated in the above categories and 
whose capacities are infinitely various. The standard of care required of these children 
is that which is reasonable to expect of children of like age, intelligence and experience. 
5. Smith v. AMLI Realty Co., 614 N.E.2d 618, 621 (Ind. Ct. App. 1993) (reversing 
summary judgment for the defendant in an action involving a nine-year-old's injuries when 
experimenting with a "Universal" exercise machine) (quoting Baller v. Corle, 490 N.E.2d 382 
(Ind. Ct. App. 1986)). 
6. E.g., Palsgraf v. Long Island R.R., 162 N.E. 99 (N.Y. 1928). 
7. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS 5 283 cmt. c (1965). 
8. See W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS 
5 32, at 181 (5th ed. 1984), in which the authors reference the "generally accepted" rule that 
whenever a child, whether as plaintiff or as defendant, engages in an activity which is 
normally one for adults only, such as driving an automobile or flying an airplane, the 
public interest and the public safety require that any consequences due to the child's 
own incapacity shall fall upon him rather than the innocent victim, and that the child 
must be held to the adult standard, without any allowance for his age. 
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The intent of this short Article is to assess the decisional law concerning 
children injured in the course of using or misusing products intended for use by 
adults and the recent American Law Institute initiatives to craft a Restatement 
flird) o[ Torts: Producfi Liability, insofar as that work affects such claims by 
children. No substantial attention will be devoted to childhood injuries involving 
toys,1° or to injuries caused by exposure to or contact with, as distinct fiom the 
use of, such products." 
Strict products liability under Restatement (Second) of Torts section 402A has 
had a thlrty-year run in which it has influenced vast and progressive change in 
products liability jurisprudence. It is anomalous, therefore, that section 402A of 
the Restatement (Second) of Torts has so poorly served its corrective justiceI2 
and instrumentalist" objectives in the abovedescribed categories of injuries to 
Id. (footnote omitted). 
9. Some discussion is devoted to the many decisions involving swimming pools, 
both of the sunken and the above-ground variety. See discussion infra at Part III(C)-(D). 
Obviously, pools are not sold or purchased primarily for use by children. Nonetheless, as 
will be seen, the swimming pool cases contain reasoning similar to that contained in the clear 
infant use of adult product cases, i.e., discussion of claims of latent defects and defenses that 
the risks were open and obvious, and not, in any event, greater than would be expected by 
a reasonable consumer. As the doctrines developed in the pool cases are part of the scope 
of this Article, they are discussed. 
10. See, e.g., First Nat'l Bank v. Regent Sports Corp., 619 F. Supp. 820 (N.D. Ill. 
1985) (regarding child's injury by lawn dart), af fd  in part, rev 'd in part, 803 F.2d 143 1 (7th 
Cir. 1986); Landrine v. Mego Corp., 464 N.Y.S.2d 516 (N.Y. App. Div. 1983) (discussing 
a suit brought on behalf of an infant who died after ingesting a balloon affixed to a doll that 
simulated the blowing of bubble gum bubbles). 
11. E.g., Lease v. International Harvester Co., 529 N.E.2d 57 (Ill. App. Ct. 1988) 
(affirming directed verdict for manufacturer in action brought on behalf of two-and-one-half- 
year-old child injured by a power riding lawnmower on which the alleged defect was lack 
of blade shutoff that would engage when mower was in reverse). 
This Article will not explore the question of whether successful prosecution of claims 
brought on behalf of children will simply invite third-party complaints against the parents for 
negligent supervision. Where colorably supported by the facts of an individual injury, the 
parent third-party defendants may have a defense of parental immunity. See, e.g., Bmnner 
v. Hutchinson Div., Lear-Siegler, Inc., 770 F. Supp. 517 (D.S.D. 1991) (involving a grain 
auger manufacturer's indemnification claim against the parents of a two-and-one-half-year-old 
child whose right hand was amputated when it came into contact with the moving auger). 
Granting the parent's motion for summary judgment on the third-party complaint, the federal 
trial court explained: 
[Tlhis Court prefers to adopt the more modem approach of the Restatement (Second) 
of Torts 8 895(g) (1977), which simply recognizes that in limited circumstances a parent 
is privileged from liability with respect to certain causes of action. Among those causes 
of action for which a parent is privileged is a claim for negligent supervision . . . . 
Bmnner, 770 F .  Supp. at 518. 
12. See generally JULES L. COLEMAN, RISKS AND WRONGS 303-05, 432-35 (1992) 
[hereinafter COLEMAN] (introducing the concept of corrective justice). 
13. See generally id., at 203-04; cf: RESTATEMENT ( HIRD) OF TORTS: PRODUCTS 
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children. Despite the sincere hopes of its authors and the American Law Institute 
that the Restatement (Second) of Torts section 402A would put the restorative 
burden of placing an unreasonably dangerous product in commerce where it 
should be-at the door of the manufacturer-section 402A has failed to protect, 
perhaps, its most vulnerable constituency, the inquisitive and often incautious 
child. 
Hope, however, lies both before and behind today's litigant of claims 
involving childhood injury arising from use of or exposure to products intended 
for adults. The venerable products liability count of negligent design permits, and 
the anticipated products liability Restatement explicitly provides for, a risk-utility 
regimen that measures the individual and societal benefits of a product, the 
product's capacity for foreseeable harm, and the burden of producing a product 
of like utility in a less hazardous form." These riskutility analyses avoid the 
quagmire of evaluation under the "consumer expectations' test of Restatement 
(Second) of Torts section 402~."  The risk-utility tests available under a count 
in negligent design and the proposed Restatement also serve to lessen the impact 
of the defense that there is no duty to design against product risks that are 
"patent" or "open and obvious" from the product's appearance.I6 The discussion 
to follow will illustrate that in jurisdictions permitting litigation of a negligent 
design claim in conjunction with a claim in strict products liability for defective 
design, a child claimant's count alleging negligence in design may in fact prove 
less precarious than the parallel count in section 402~ . "  
11. P ~ o ~ u c r s  LIABILITY UNDER NEGLIGENCE AND 
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF  TOR^ SECTION 402A 
A. Generally 
For children using adult devices, the principal arguments employed for 
avoiding liability have been that (1) the product was not "dangerous to an extent 
LIABILITY 2, cmt. a, at 11 (Council Draft NO. IA, 1994) [hereinafter Council Draft IA] 
("[Tlort law serves the instrumental function of creating safety initiatives."). 
14. E.g., Council Draft IA, supra note 13, 5 2 cmt. d, at 28. This comment 
illustrates the considerations properly involved in determining "whether an alternative design 
is reasonable and whether its omission renders a product not reasonably safe" as including 
"without limitation, the magnitude of foreseeable risks of harm, the nature and strength of 
consumer expectations, the effects on costs of production, the effects of the alternative design 
on product function, the relative advantages and disadvantages of proposed safety features, 
product longevity, maintenance and repair, esthetics, and marketability." 
Id. CJ Griggs v. BIC Corp., 981 F.2d 1429, 1435-36 (3d Cir. 1992) (interpreting risk-utility 
analysis under plaintiffs negligent design count). 
15. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS 5 402A cmts. g, i (1965). 
16. Council Draft lA, supra note 13, Reporters' Notes to 5 2 cmt. c, at 149-51. 
17. Moreover, plaintiffs' counsel may anticipate the future benefits expected to be 
conferred by the Restatement (Third) of Torts: Products Liability and its expected risk-utility 
standard for design defect. See Council Draft IA, supra note 13, 5 2(b), at 9. 
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beyond that which would be contemplated by the ordinary [person];"'* (2) 
the risks posed by the product were open and obvio~s ; '~  (3) the child was 
not a foreseeable user of the product; and (4) the child's behavior constitut- 
ed an unforeseeable misuse of the product, thus breaking the proximate 
causal link between design and injury.20 
Concededly, some childhood injuries require the conclusion that the cost 
and other burdens of the injury should remain with the injured child and not 
shift to the manufacturer, seller, or other third party.2' For example, 
childhood misuse may break the causal connection between a manufacturer's 
design or warning and the injury when the appearance or promotion of the 
product does not by itself attract the risky behavior.22 A few common- 
place products are unlikely to trigger liability in the absence of some bizarre 
or malevolent concatenation of events. As one court stated: 
Toothpicks like pencils, pins, needles, knives, razor blades, nails, tools of 
most kinds, bottles and other objects made of glass, present obvious 
dangers to users, but they are not unreasonably dangerous, in part because 
the very obviousness of the danger puts the user on notice. It is part of 
normal upbringing that one learns in childhood to cope with the dangers 
posed by such useful everyday items. It is foreseeable that some will be 
careless in using such items and will be injured, but the policy of our law 
18. Lamkin v. Towner, 563 N.E.2d 449, 458 (Ill. 1990) (quoting  RESTATE^ 
(SECOND) OF TORTS $402A cmt. i (1965)). Lamkin is one of a multitude of suits that have 
been brought against manufacturers of screen windows and like window coverings that have 
failed to prevent childhood falls. See, e.g., Drager v. Aluminum Indus., 495 N.W:2d 879 
(Minn. Ct. App. 1993). 
19. E.g., First Nat'l Bank v. Regent Sports Corp., 803 F.2d 1431 (7th Cir.) (holding 
the dangers of the lawn dart to be inherently obvious under Illinois law), affd in part, rev'd 
in part, 878 F.2d 384 (1986). 
20. E.g., Drager, 495 N.W.2d 879. Affirming summary judgment for a window 
screen manufacturer following severe injuries to a child who fell from a window, the court 
stated: "The window screen manufacturer had no duty to design a screen which would 
prevent appellant's fall. We also conclude that the relationship between appellant's injury 
and [the] manufacturer's failure to warn is too remote to impose liability as a matter of law." 
Id. at 885-86. 
21. For example, in Kempes v. Dunlop Tire & Rubber Corp., 548 N.E.2d 644 (Ill. 
App. Ct. 1989), eight-year-old Matthew Kempes cut open a golf ball manufactured by 
defendant. After passing the tightly-wrapped rubber bands, plaintiff pierced the center of the 
ball, loosing a squirt that injured his eye severely. The center of the gold ball at the time 
was made of a paste that contained "bentonite clay, water, barium sulfate, zinc, glycerin and 
methyl salicylate." Id. at 645. 
22. See Brawner v. Liberty Indus., 573 S.W.2d 376 (Mo. Ct. App. 1978). Brawner 
involved injuries sustained by a seven-year-old child who, with a friend the same age, 
removed the lid from a gasoline storage container, which then ignited. The court stated: "We 
have found no case, nor have we been cited to one, where a product made for adult use is 
deemed defective and unreasonably dangerous solely because it has not been made child- 
proof." Id. at 378. 
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in such cases is not to shift the loss fiom the careless user to a blameless 
manufacturer or ~upplier.'~ 
This Article takes the position that such manufacturer immunity fiom 
liability, limited by logic and cultural necessity to a circumscribed set of 
common products, has been unfairly and unnecessarily extended far beyond 
its original precincts, barring liability for a wide variety of product-caused 
harms. 
B. The Manufacturer's Design and Warning Obligation 
Regarding Foreseeable Product Misuse 
1. Generally 
Generally, the product manufacturer's informational obligation (the duty 
to provide adequate warnings and instructions), and its design obligation, 
extend beyond creating or adopting designs for, and providing cautionary 
information concerning, the pristine, intended use of the product. The 
design and informational duties require that the manufacturer contemplate 
product uses that, while not intended, are f~reseeable.~~ 
2. Design Duty 
For example, in McCormack v. Hanbcraft C.0.:' a case involving 
severe injuries to a child who tipped over a vaporizer and was scalded with 
near-boiling water, the Minnesota Supreme Court, while recognizing that 
"the primary, intended use of the vaporizer was for the treatment of 
children's colds and croup,"26 held nevertheless that the "defendant failed 
to exercise reasonable care . . . to guard against the reasonably foreseeable 
danger that a child would tip the unit over when it was in use and be 
seriously burned by coming in contact with the scalding water . . . ."" 
23. Killeen v. Harmon Grain Prods., Inc., 413 N.E.2d 767,770 (Mass. App. Ct. 1980) 
(citations omitted), quoted in Griggs v. BIC Corp., 786 F. Supp. 1203, 1204-05 (M.D. Pa. 
1992). affd in part, rev'd in part, 981 F.2d 1429 (3d Cir. 1992). 
24. See' 1 M. STUART MADDEN, PRODUCTS LIABILITY 5 10.6 (2d ed. 1988 & Supp. 
1994) [hereinafter MADDEN]; see also Westbrock v. Marshalltown Mfg. Co., 473 N.W.2d 352 
(Mim. Ct. App. 1991), where the court states: 
[A] manufacturer is obligated to exercise that degree of care in his plan or design so as 
to avoid any unreasonable risk of harm to anyone who is likely to be exposed to the 
danger when the product is used in the manner for which the product was intended, as 
well as an unintended yet reasonably foreseeable use. 
Id. at 356 (quoting Bilotta v. Kelley Co., 346 N.W.2d 616, 624 (Minn. 1984)). 
25. 154 N.W.2d 488 (Mim. 1967). 
26. Id. at 497. 
27. Id. Hankcraft is employed as an illustration for the proposition by the authors 
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The reader appreciating the logic of Hankscraft might suppose it would be 
fairly and widely applicable to various other settings in which a child's 
failure to understand fully the risks posed by a product inadvertently triggers 
a hazardous incident. However, the opposite conclusion is too often 
reached. For example, and in counterpoint to the reasoning of Hankscraft, 
numerous decisions exculpate manufacturers of poorly-designed products on 
the grounds that the manufacturer of a product for adult use has no duty to 
make it "~hi ld-~roof . "~~ Consider Adams v. Perry Furniture C O . , ~ ~  a suit 
brought by the personal representatives of the estates of minor children who 
perished in a mattress fire started by disposable butane lighters manufactured 
by the BIC Corporation. Affirming in part the lower court's grant of 
summary judgment for the lighter manufacturer, the Michigan Court of 
Appeals concluded: 
The parties do not dispute that it is foreseeable that children will handle 
lighters and might injure themselves in doing so. However, we are not 
persuaded that the risk of this danger imposes a duty upon the manu- 
facturer to make it child-resistant in light of the fact that the product is 
intended to be sold to adults.30 
3. Duty to Warn 
a. Causation and the Heeding Presumption 
How is the infant plaintiff to prove a causal connection between the 
absence of a warning, or an inadequate warning, when fiequently the child 
cannot yet read? In addition, even when the child can read, the behavioral 
premise of most claims of inadequate warnings regarding childhood use is 
that a child's reasoning and judgment is insufficiently developed to permit 
a mature; and, in hindsight, reasonably safe decision to encounter the risk. 
The answer to this question is that substantial decisional support exists for 
the proposition that it is sufficient that the parent or guardian offer evidence 
that had an adequate warning been given to the responsible adult, it would 
of the Restatement (Third) of Torts: Products Liabilify. See Council Draf? lA, supra note 
13, $ 2 cmt. d, illus. 5, at 30-32. 
28. E.g., Kelley v. Rival Mfg. Co., 704 F. Supp. 1039, 1043-44 (W.D. Okla. 1989) 
(crock-pot); Rhodes v. R.G. Indus. 325 S.E.2d 465, 466 (Ga. Ct. App. 1984) (handgun); 
Brawner v. Liberty Indus., 573 S.W.2d 376, 377-78 (Mo. Ct. App. 1978) (gasoline 
container); see also Curtis v. Universal Match Co., 778 F. Supp. 1421, 1427 (E.D. Tenn. 
1991) (collecting above authority), affd, 966 F.2d 1451 (6th Cir. 1992). 
29. 497 N.W.2d 514 (Mich. Ct. App. 1993), appeal denied, 519 N.W.2d 860 (Mich. 
1994). 
30. Id. at 520. The symbiosis between (1) the intended user or intended purchaser 
rationale for denying childhood injury claims, and (2) the interpretation of the consumer 
expectations test of the comments to $ 402A, which evaluate only the expectations of adults 
as to adult (and not childhood) misadventures, is discussed infra in Part IV(A)-(B). 
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have been read and heeded, and measures would have been taken to insulate 
the child from the ha~ard .~ '  
This "heeding presumption" was explained by the Fifth Circuit in Reyes 
v. Wyeth ~abora to r i e s .~~  The court stated, "Where a consumer, whose 
injury the manufacturer should have reasonably foreseen, is injured by a 
product sold without a required warning, a rebuttable presumption will arise 
that the consumer would have read any warning provided by the manufac- 
turer, and acted so as to minimize the risks."33 The presumption is not 
confined in its applicability to child injury contexts, and has been found 
applicable to products liability cases involving a myriad of products, ranging 
from asbestos34 to swimming pool  trampoline^.^' 
Illustrative of the application of the heeding presumption in the context 
of a child's recreational injury is Nissen Trampoline Co. v. Terre Haute 
First National Bank,36 which involved a circular trampoline, thirty-six 
inches in diameter, marketed for use as a swimming pool acces~ory.~' The 
thirteen-year-old plaintiff suffered a leg injury, ultimately requiring 
amputation, when his foot slipped through the cables attaching the jumping 
platform to the trampoline frame, causing him to fall and become suspended 
from the frame.38 Evidence at trial showed that prior to marketing the 
product, Nissen had conducted tests demonstrating the potential for mishaps 
of the type that befell plaintiff.39 The Indiana appellate court found that 
Nissen's failure to provide a warning about a known risk was sufficient to 
31. E.g., Emery v. Federated Foods, Inc., 863 P.2d 426 (Mont. 1993). In Emery, 
which involved a two-and-one-half-year-old girl's injury from choking upon a marshmallow, 
the Montana Supreme Court noted approvingly the mother's affidavit, in which she stated 
"if I had been warned of the risk . . ., I would not have purchased them at all. . . . I usually 
read labels on food products prior to buying them. I always take note of warnings on labels 
about risks to children." Id. at 432. "At a minimum," the court concluded, "this evidence 
raises a genuine issue of material fact regarding causation." Id. 
32. 498 F.2d 1264 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1096 (1974). 
33. Id. at 128, cited with approval in Cunningham v. Charles Pfizer & Co., 532 P.2d 
1377, 138 1-82 (Okla. 1974). 
34. Coffman v. Keene Corp., 628 A.2d 710, 718 (N.J. 1993) ("[Ulse of the heeding 
presumption provides a powerful incentive for manufacturers to abide by their duty to 
provide adequate warnings."). 
35. Nissen Trampoline Co. v. Terre Haute First Nat'l Bank, 332 N.E.2d 820, 826 
(Ind. App. 1975) (using the heeding presumption "would . . . discourage those manufacturers 
who would rather risk liability than provide a warning which would impair the marketability 
of the product."), superseded on other grounh, 358 N.E.2d 974 (Ind. 1976). 
36. Id. 
37. The advertisements read, in part, that the Aqua Diver was "twice as much fun as 
an old-fashioned diving board at half the cost." Id. at 82 1. 
38. Id. 
39. Id. at 822. 
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support a finding of a defective condition.@ The court then adopted the 
"heeding" presumption, stating that 
the law should supply the presumption that an adequate warning would 
have been read and heeded, thereby minimizing the obvious problems of 
proof of causation. We find such an approach to be meritorious, workable, 
and desirable. 
. . . .  
Placing the burden of rebutting the presumption of causation on the 
manufacturer in failure to warn cases is not inconsistent with the policies 
behind strict liability. It would encourage manufacturers to provide safe 
products and to warn of the known dangers in the use of the product which 
might cause injury. Such a presumption would also discourage those 
manufacturers who would rather risk liability than provide a warning which 
would impair the marketability of the product!' 
The key to the operation of the duty to warn and the invocation of its 
concomitant heeding presumption is that an adult product with which 
children may have contact must contain warnings and instructions advising 
adults on the special risks to children that the product may create. A 
separate obligation to provide cautionary information concerning childhood 
risks should obtain even when, as in the case of baby the product 
poses no measurable risks to adults. 
b. The "Open and Obvious" Rule: Simple Tools 
The durable tort rule that the manufacturer need not provide warnings 
or instructions regarding product risks that are open and obvious was 
presented plainly by the Michigan Supreme Court in Glittenberg v. 
Doughboy Recreational Indu~tries."~ The court stated: "The manufacturer 
of a simple product has no duty to warn of the product's potentially 
dangerous conditions or characteristics that are readily apparent or visible 
upon casual inspection and reasonably expected to be recognized by the 
average user of ordinary intelligen~e."~~ Throughout the nation, decisions 
40. Id. at 825. 
41. Id. at 826-27 (footnotes omitted). 
42. E.g., Ayers v. Johnson & Johnson Baby Prods. Co., 818 P.2d 1337, 1343 (Wash., 
1991) (holding manufacturer responsible for child's cardiac arrest and brain damage due to 
aspiration of manufacturer's popular baby oil). 
43. 491 N.W.2d 208,210 (Minn. 1992). 
44. Id. In Carlson v. BIC Corp., 840 F. Supp. 457 (E.D. Mich. 1993), a suit arising 
h m  the death of children in a fire started by a child playing with a disposable lighter, the 
court identified Jamieson v. Woodward & Lotimp, 247 F.2d 23 @.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 355 
U.S. 855 (1957), as an early decision employing the "simple tool" exception to a warning 
obligation. 840 F. Supp. at 460. In Jarnieson, which involved an elastic band employed as 
an exerciser, the D.C. Circuit explained: "A manufacturer cannot manufacture a knife that 
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that hold there is no duty to warn of "open and obvious dangers" so state 
only for the otherwise nondefective product. For example, in Glittenberg, 
which involved injuries sustained by a child in using an above ground pool, 
the Michigan court wrote that the "open and obvious" rationale applies only 
to instances in which "the consumer is in just as good a position as the 
manufacturer to gauge the dangers associated with the use of the prod- 
U C ~ . ' ' ~ ~  
In Carlson v. BIC C ~ r p . ; ~  a Michigan federal trial court applied 
Glittenberg to claims brought on behalf of three children who died in a fire 
allegedly caused by their playful use of one of defendant's disposable 
lighters. The evidence suggested that one of the child decedents had secured 
the lighter from the top of the refrigerator in their mobile home.47 In 
employing the "open and obvious" or "simple tool" rule, the trial court 
explained initially that the rule's application to a manufacturer's warnings 
obligations required an evidential focus upon (1) "the typical user's 
perception and knowledge," and (2) "whether the condition that creates the 
danger associated with the product's use (i.e. the flame which is produced 
by a 'roll and press' operation) is 'fully apparent, widely known, commonly 
recognized and anticipated by the ordinary user.'"48 In the court's words: 
The disposable lighter in the instant case falls within the criteria relied 
upon in Glittenberg. There is no claim that defendant's disposable lighter 
possesses characteristics and features which are not readily apparent or 
easily discernable upon casual inspection. Indeed, it would be difficult to 
conceive of a device with more universally known or readily apparent 
characteristics. In addition, unlike highly mechanized and difficult to 
operate products that Michigan courts have deemed to be "complex," the 
defendant's hand-held lighter merely requires the user to spin a small 
wheel with the thumb while simultaneously depressing a button to emit 
fuel. This "roll and press" operation consists of a rudimentary design 
which cannot be characterized as being complex or highly mechanized. In 
will not cut or a hammer that will not mash a thumb or a stove that will not bum a finger. 
The law does not require [manufacturers] to wam of such common dangers." 247 F.2d at 26. 
A part of the courts' reluctance to depart from decisional authority reflecting no leniency 
for childhood limitations in perception, judgment, and motor skills, derives from the 
perceptible gravitational pull of the general tort rule of nonrescue. For example, Michigan 
decisional law came to recognize the duty to warn in products liability matters as "an 
exception to the general rule of non rescue, imposing an obligation on sellers to transmit 
safety-related information if they know or should know that the buyer or user is unaware of 
that information." Glittenberg, 491 N.W.2d at 21 1. 
45. 491 N.W.2d at 213 (quoting 3 AMERICAN LAW OF PRODUCTS LIABILITY, 3 ~ ,  
5 33:25 (1993)). 
46. 840 F. Supp. at 457. 
47. Id. at 459. 
48. Id. (quoting Glittenberg, 49 1 N.W.2d at 21 3). ' 
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short this Court finds that defendant's hand-held lighter is a "simple 
t001."~~ 
In retrospect, it is seen that the key to the decision in Carlson was the 
plaintiffs' failure to plead and prove that in the context of the advertising, 
marketing, and substantial diversion of these products into the hands of 
children, children as a class became ordinary, if not typical, users of the 
product. The stakes in this designation were, for the Carlson court, outcome 
dispositive, as evidenced by the court's conclusion: 
Plaintiffs in the instant case do not contend that young children are the 
typical or ordinary users of defendant's lighters, but merely that they are 
"foreseeable misusers." Therefore, the children's subjective knowledge 
(or lack thereof) of the harm that the lighter could cause is irrelevant to the 
question of whether the dangers was "open and obvious." This Court 
holds that when the inquiry is properly focused on the typical users of 
disposable lighters (i.e. adults) there can be no dispute that the danger 
presented by a disposable lighter (i.e. that fire will be produced when the' 
roller is depressed) is "open and obvious."50 
c. The Limitations of the Open and Obvious Rule 
The underlying premise of the open and obvious rule is that a warning 
should be provided where a manufacturer has superior knowledge of a 
product risk, but no such duty exists where "the consumer is in just as good 
a position as the manufacturer to gauge the dangers associated with the 
pr~duct."~' This cultural and cognitive assumption is precarious as applied 
to adults, and is nakedly inapplicable to children. 
The limitations of applying the "open and obvious" rule to children were 
best stated by Professor Jerry J. Phillips in these words: "The assumption 
that children will expose themselves to danger in ways that a reasonable 
adult would not precludes the manufacturer's reliance on the obviousness of 
the product's danger to the child   la in tiff."^^ Additionally, the latent 
49. 840 F. Supp. at 461. In the omitted footnote, the court listed several products 
that Michigan courts have held to be "complex," including "a highly mechanized log-splitter 
powered by a gasoline engine and requiring two persons to operate," a "large mechanical 
baling machine," and an "elaborate automated bottle-labelling machine which required 
continuous maintenance." Id. at 461 n. 1. 
50. Id. at 461 (citations omitted). 
51. Glittenberg, 491 N.W.2d at 213 (quoting 3 AMERICAN LAW OF PRODUCTS 
LIABILITY, 3D 8 33:25 (1993)). 
52. Jerry J. Phillips, Products Liabilityfor Personal Injury to Minors, 56 VA. L. REV. 
1223, 1225 (1970). Professor Phillips concluded: "[Elven the best of educational efforts 
cannot be expected to change the essential nature of children, and, unless we are prepared 
to ignore this fact, in many instances better product design presents the only realistic means 
available for protecting children against injury." Id. at 1240-41 (footnote omitted). See 
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nature of a potential harm may often require the conclusion that the risk 
cannot fairly be called "obvious." For example, in Keller v. Welles 
Department S t ~ r e , ' ~  which involved injury to a two-year-old child who 
played with a gasoline container in proximity to the home's gas furnace and 
hot water heater, the court distinguished the obviousness of the danger 
associated with a gasoline container fiom that of a self-latching swimming 
pool gate.'4 Contrasting the two dangers, the court said: "While the defect 
in the gasoline can was not concealed, this court is unable to conclude, as 
a matter of law, that the absence of a child-proof cap was an obvious as 
opposed to a latent condition."" 
The limitations of the "simple tool" component of the open and obvious 
evaluation are likewise apparent. It is by no means a matter of judicial 
notice as to what constitutes a simple tool and what does not. For example, 
in Bondie v. BIC C~rp . , ' ~  a federal trial court in. Michigan held that the 
open and obvious rule should be applied only to simple tools. In ruling 
against the manufacturer, the court permitted the inference that the 
disposable butane lighter was not a simple to01.~' Nevertheless, within a 
year, the same district court in another BIC butane lighter suit applied the 
open and obvious rule and held that BIC had no duty to “child- roof' its 
lighter because "[a] disposable, butane lighter is unquestionabl; a simple 
t001."'~ 
A. Generally 
Decisions in some jurisdictions have been markedly progressive in 
resisting the dismissal of child injury claims on the basis that the risks were 
"obvious." For example, in Emery v. Federated Foods, I ~ c . , ' ~  which 
involved a marshmallow that became lodged in a two-and-a-half-year-old 
boy's windpipe and caused brain-damaging anoxia before his mother was 
able to force its expulsion, the Supreme Court of Montana reversed the teal 
generally April A. Caso, Note, Unreasonably Dangerous Products From a Child's 
Perspective: A Proposal For a Reasonable Child Consumer Expectation Test, 20 RUTGERS 
L.J. 433 (1989). 
53. 276 N.W.2d 319 (Wis. Ct. App. 1978). 
54. See id. at 322. 
55. Id. at 323. 
56. 739 F. Supp. 346 (E.D. Mich. 1990). 
57. Id. at 350 n.4. 
58. Kirk v. Hanes Corp., 771 F. Supp. 856, 858 (E.D. Mich. 1991), affd, 16 F.3d 
705 (6th Cir. 1994). 
59. 863 P.2d 426 (Mont. 1993). 
Heinonline - -  61 Tenn. L. Rev. 1217 1993-1994 
1218 TENNESSEE LA W RE VIEW [Vol. 61: 1205 
court's grant of summary judgment to the wholesale and retail sellers of the 
marshmallows.60 The child's mother, alleging that the marshmallows were 
defective for want of a warning about the dangers of childhood aspiration, 
had filed a suit under the theories of strict products liability and implied 
~a r r an ty .~ '  The trial court apparently relied upon comments j and i to 
section 402A of the Restatement (Second) of Torts, and concluded that "a 
seller is not required to warn with respect to products which are only 
dangerous when consumed in excessive quantities if that danger is generally 
known and re~ognized."~~ 
The Montana Supreme Court rejected the reasoning of the trial court and 
noted that a technically pure product can be rendered dangerously defective 
"if purchasers and likely users have been misinformed or inadequately 
informed about either the risks or the dangers involved in the use of the 
product or how to avoid or minimize the harmful consequences from such 
risk."63 The court quoted at length from the affidavit of one of plaintiffs 
two experts, Dr. Loube, who explained that significant choking risks are 
posed by foods that, like the marshmallow, expand upon entry into a moist 
area such as the human breathing apparat~s.~" Plaintiffs second expert, a 
Dr. Dingus, stated that without an appropriate warning, a reasonable parent 
might not recognize these risks to small ~hildren.~' The court concluded 
that summary judgment had been granted erroneously, as genuine issues of 
60. Id. at 428-29. 
61. Id. 
62. Id. 
63. Id. 
64. Id. at 432. In Dr. Loube's words: 
Food items are often particularly dangerous in that they change their characteristics 
and consistency when they are soaked with the liquid secretions that are present in the 
breathing tubes of the lungs. These secretions usually cause some swelling of the food 
so that it further obstructs the breathing passage. 
A marshmallow is a particularly hazardous confection as a risk of aspiration in 
children under the age of three. It is sweet and, therefore, has a great deal of appeal to 
small children. It appears soft and innocuous to parents and does not present the same 
apparent risk that might be perceived by a parent when considering a piece of hard 
candy or a jelly bean. 
An aspirated piece of marshmallow can be very difficult to dislodge. Because it 
continues to expand after entering the airway it can efficiently obstruct a large breathing 
passage, perhaps even the trachea (the main breathing tube). An aspirated marshmallow 
fragment might not be reachable with a finger and could be difficult to dislodge with 
a Heimlich maneuver. 
Id. 
65. Id. 
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material fact regarding the necessity of a warning had been advanced by 
plaintiffs below.66 
In some suits a party's failure to prove that the product causing a child's 
injury was unreasonably dangerous has not precluded recovery when the 
facts of the case support a characterization of the product as a dangerous . 
instrumentality, and, therefore, an element of an attractive nuisance claim. 
For example, in Smith v. AMLI Realfy C O . , ~ ~  a nine-year-old child visiting 
his father's apartment agreed to cooperate in a "trick" that another child 
had learned to perform on a Universal Weight Machine in the weight room 
of the apartment complex. By misadventure, seventy pounds in exercise 
weights fell upon the visiting child's hand, crushing and lacerating two 
finges6* Although the court concluded that the Universal Machine was 
not "unreasonably dangerous" within the meaning of Indiana products 
liability law, it nonetheless observed that such a conclusion did not preclude 
pursuit of a claim in attractive n~isance,6~ offering this analogy: 
Under the product liability act then, an instrument may be "dangerous" as 
that term is commonly understood, yet not be "unreasonably dangerous" 
for purposes of strict liability under the act. For instance, a loaded gun 
may not be "unreasonably dangerous" for product liability purposes as long 
as it functions properly, i.e. it hurls a projectile at a target. However, the 
same gun left within the reach of children is a "dangerous instrument" and 
the person previously possessing the gun is negligent for making it easily 
accessible to those who cannot comprehend the full magnitude of its 
destructive ~apabilities.'~ 
B. The Disposable Lighter Cases 
Curtis v. Universal Match C O ~ ~ . ~ '  is representative of the first genera- 
tion of disposable lighter injury cases, many involving injuries to children, 
and few resulting in findings of manufacturer liability. In Curtis, the infant 
plaintiff was injured after his brother, then three years and nine months old, 
set fire to his diaper, using a disposable butane cigarette lighter manufac- 
tured by defendant F e ~ d o r . ~ ~  The fire occurred in the back seat of the 
father's automobile, where the parent had left the children while visiting a 
Applying Tennessee's Products Liability Act,74 which contains 
66. Id. at 433. 
67. 614 N.E.2d 61 8 (Ind. Ct. App. 1993). 
68. Id. 
69. Id. at 623. 
70. Id. at 622. 
71. 778 F. Supp. 1421 (E.D. Tenn. 1991). 
72. Id. at 1424. 
73. Id. 
74. TENN. CODE ANN. $ 5  29-28-101 through -108 (1980 & Supp. 1993). 
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a "consumer expectations" test of product defect," the court's preliminary 
conclusion was: 
In a products liability action involving a minor plaintiff who is injured by a 
product designed for use by adults, the question of whether a product is 
unreasonably dangerous is premised upon the contemplation of an ordinary adult 
consumer rather than the viewpoint of the minor child In the present case, the 
intended and odmary consumer of a cigarette lighter is an adult, and such 
lighters are obviously designed exclusively for use by adults.76 
Plaintiffs claim of inadequate warning, premised upon the lighter's simple 
statement "KEEP OUT OF REACH OF CHILDREN," was, in turn, vitiated by 
testimony of plaintiffs mother that she had repeatedly advised plaintiffs father 
to stop leaving his lighter in plain view of the childrenn 
The varying substantive causes of action pursued by plaintiffs and the 
alternative bases of disposition selected by the courts have muddied any 
perceptible teaching of the disposable lighter decisions. Even suits resulting in 
reversals of summary judgments granted to lighter manuf8ctums and other sellers 
do not necessarily provide coherent encouragement to those urging a special duty 
of care or informational obligation on the part of manufacturers or sellers. For 
example, in Glover v. BIC Corp.,78 an appeal of an action brought on behalf of 
an adult decedent who perished in a fire allegedly caused by the failure of a 
disposable lighter to extinguish hlly following use, the Court of Appeals for the 
Ninth Circuit aflimed the federal trial court's denial of plaintiffs claims of design 
defect and failure to provide adequate warnings, but remanded on the issues of 
defective manufacturing and breach of the standard of care.79 
On the legal issue of the manukturer's duty to decedent, the Ninth Circuit 
stated that under Oregon law, 
[t]o establish a duty, the plaintiff need only prove facts which establish either the 
existence of a statute, status or relationship, or, in the absence of one of these, 
75. TENN. CODE ANN. 8 29-28-102(8) (1980 & Supp. 1993). 
76. Curtis, 778 F. Supp. at 1425 (citations omitted). Unencumbered by tort doctrine, 
the Consumer Product Safety Commission published a Final Rule, under the Consumer 
Product Safety Act, on July 12, 1993, that "requires disposable and novelty lighters . . . to 
meet specified requirements for child resistance." Safety Standards for Cigarette Lighters, 
58 Fed. Reg. 37,557 (1993) (to be codified at 16 C.F.R. 8 1210). The Commission's 
Summary of its Final Rule continues: "The requirements are intended to reduce the risk of 
injuries and deaths that occur from fires started by children under the age of 5 playing with 
cigarette lighters." Id. 
77. 778 F. Supp. at 1425-26. 
78. 6 F.3d 1318 (9th Cir.), superseding 987 F.2d 1410 (1993), amended per denial 
of reh 'g and reh 'g en banc. 
79. Id. at 1332. The probative quality of this decision is affected by the finding that 
the decedent's blood alcohol level at the time of the accident was .35. See id. at 1321. 
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conduct by the defendant which ''unreasonably created a foreseeable risk to a 
protectable interest of the kind of harm that befell the 
Here, in the setting of an injury claim brought on behalf of an adult user, a 
finding of a "manufacturerluser relationship" sufficient to "creat[e] a legal duty 
in BIC" is straightforward." From this identified duty, the court proceeded to 
find issues for the jury on the grounds of BIC's continued sale of lighters that 
hiled to meet ASTM standards and its failure to change either the design or the 
method of manufacture after being put on notice that some lighters failed to 
e~tinguish.~~ 
In Campbell v. BIC C0q7.,8~ a New York trial court evaluated a manufactur- 
er's motion to dismiss a claim based on injuries sustained when a six-year-old 
boy ignited a lighter beneath his shirt. The manufacturer relied on section 402A 
which provides, in the court's words, that "a manufacturer does not owe a 
plaintiff a duty of care unless its product was in a condition not reasonably 
contemplated by the ultimate consumer and was being used for the purposes and 
in the manner normally intende~l."'~ Specifically, the manufacturer argued that 
because "[s]ection 402A recognizes that a manufacturer is not an insurer for every 
injury that may arise h m  the use of its product," the plaintiff was by definition 
incapable of arguing that the lighter was in a condition not reasonably conternplat- 
ed by the ultimate consumer because (1) "the use of [defendant's] lighter by a 
child is not a normally intended use;" and (2) the "risks associated with a lighter 
are open and obvious."' 
Although the court ultimately dismissed plaintiffs complaint on statute of 
limitations grounds, it turned aside defendant's arguments as to both plaintiffs 
claims in negligence and in strict products stating that under New 
80. Id. at 1325. 
81. Id. 
82. Id. In the court's words: 
Glover produced expert testimony which showed: (1) no reasonable lighter manufacturer 
would sell a lighter which failed to meet the ASTM standards for extinguishment; (2) 
BIC continued to sell some lighters between 1981 and 1985 which failed to meet the 
ASTM standards; (3) BIC knew that such lighters could set someone on fire; (4) BIC 
knew the brass chips could cause the lighter to fail to extinguish; (5) BIC was on notice 
that some lighters had continued to bum and had injured persons; and (6) BIC failed to 
change the design of the lighter during the time in question, and failed to change the 
method of manufacturing which created the brass debris problem until 1986. We hold 
this evidence is sufficient to affirm the court's submission of the negligence claim to 
the jury. 
Id. 
83. 586 N.Y.S.2d 871 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1992). 
84. Id. at 873. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS $ 402A (1965). 
85. Campbell, 586 N.Y.S.2d at 873. 
86. Id. ('The Court will also deny the motion as to plaintiffs negligence cause of 
action since in a design defect case there is almost no difference between a negligence cause 
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York law "a manufkhmr also has a duty to design its product so that it avoids 
an ummonable risk of ham when it is being used for an unintended but 
foreseeable use."' Creating a structure of corrective justice hewn entirely h r n  
concepts of reasonable foreseeability, the New York trial court explained: 
"Because the lighters manuktured by defendant are commonly used and kept 
about the home, it is m n a b l y  foreseeable that children will have access to them 
and will try to use them. Thus, the Court h d s  that defendant did owe plaintiff 
a duty of care.'"8 
The highest courts in jurisdictions employing a consumer expectation standard 
of defect routinely turn to evaluation of foreseeability and the feasibility of 
alternative designs in measuring a manufacturer's design obligations to child users 
of ostensibly adult products. For example, in Bean v. BIC Cop.,* the Alabama 
Supreme Court, after noting that under Alabama law "'Defective' is interpreted 
to mean that the product does not meet the reasonable expectations of an ordinary 
consumer as to its safety," observed that "[tlhe scope of a manufacturer's legal 
duty . . . depends upon two factors: (1) the foreseeability of the danger, and (2) 
the feasibility of an alternative design that adverts that danger."' Interpreting 
the issue before it to be "whether a manufacturer will ever have a duty to make 
a product intended to be used by adults safer by designing and manufacturing the 
product to deter or discourage use by children unable to appreciate the risks 
involved in use of the product," the court stated: 
Because BIC conceded that "it is feasible to design a more child-resistant 
lighter and also foreseeable that a child may come in contact with the lighter" 
. . . . [w]e decline to make the sweeping and decisive pronouncement that a 
manufacturer of a product that it intends to be used by adults never has a duty 
to make the product safer by making it child-resistant when the dangers are 
foreseeable and prevention of the danger is feasible."93 
C. The Above-Ground Pool Cases 
Some decisions involving both childhood and adult injuries h m  diving or 
sliding into above-ground pools indicate that an aesthetic suggestion, by liner 
of action and one sounding in strict products liability.") (citations omitted). 
87. Id. (emphasis added) (citations omitted). 
88. Id. The court continued: "The law of the other jurisdictions cited by defendant 
does not affect this finding as it is not comparable to New York's. Nor does defendant's 
invocation of the 'open and obvious' doctrine because in New York that is simply another 
factor that is considered in determining the reasonable care exercised by the parties." Id. 
(citations omitted). 
89. 597 So. 2d 1350 (Ala. 1992). 
90. Id. at 1352 (quoting Casrell v. Altec Indus., Inc., 335 So. 2d 128, 133 (Ala. 
1976)). 
91. Id. 
92. Id. 
93. Id. 
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color or otherwise, that the pool is sufficiently deep to permit diving creates an 
issue of fact as to whether a child plaintiffs diving constituted conduct of 
sufficient recklessness as to render it an unforeseeable superseding event. For 
example, in Amatulli v. Delhi Construction CO. ,~  the New York Court of 
Appeals reviewed, among other issues, the denial of a pool distributor's motion 
for summary judgment in a suit brought on behalf of a sixteen-year-old boy who 
was injured while diving into an above-ground pool that had been installed 
partially below ground?' This unorthodox installation, which had the effect of 
letting the pool appear deeper than it actually was, was done at the suggestion of 
the pool distributor.% Affirming the lower courts' denial of summary judgment 
as to the distributor and to the homeowner, the Court of Appeals implicitly 
endorsed the plaintiffs argument that the installation 
contributed to the creation of the illusion that the pool was of a depth sufficient 
for diving; that although he was aware of shallowness mund the edges of the 
pool, it appeared to be deep enough toward the center[;] . . . [such that] it cannot 
be said as a matter of law, on this record, that "only one [legal] conclusion may 
be drawn h m  the established k t s "  or that his conduct in diving into this pool 
under the circumstances was "reckless conduct," constituting an unforeseeable 
superseding event such as would absolve these defendants of liability.97 
The body of authority holding that the conventional above-ground or below- 
ground pool is neither unreasonably dangerous nor defective98 must be doctrinal- 
ly assigried elsewhere if there is to be a consistent thesis for childhood recovery 
fiom adult product harms. One court distinguished the swimming pool cases 
from cases involving injuries caused by failure to child-proof a cap to a gasoline 
can in this way: 
It is common knowledge that children are attracted to swimming pools and that 
precautions must therefore be taken. The danger to a young child h m  a 
swimming pool is obvious. The hazards to a child arising fiom a gasoline can 
without a childproof cap are not so readily apparent. A child is not so clearly 
94. 571 N.E.2d 645 (N.Y. 1991). 
95. Id. at 647. In the court's words, "The pool was four feet deep, and was designed, 
manufactured and marketed for installation above ground. However, it was installed with 
two feet of the pool sunken into the ground and a deck built partially around the pool which 
gave it the appearance of an in-ground pool." Id. 
96. Id. at 650 ("[Tlhe submissions demonstrate, without contradiction, that the Susis 
[the homeowners] had the pool installed, upon the advice of the distributor, Brothers, in a 
manner that concealed its true depth and gave it the appearance of being an in-ground 
pool."). 
97. Id. (citations omitted). The Court of Appeals concluded: "These factual issues 
raise questions for resolution by the jury and summary judgment [for the homeowners and 
the distributor] was properly denied." Id. 
98. See, e.g., Glittenberg v. Doughboy Recreational Indus., 491 N.W.2d 208 (Mich. 
1992); Vincer v. Esther Williams All-Aluminum Swimming Pool Co., 230 N.W.2d 794 (Wis. 
1975). 
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attracted to this product that an adult would immediately be put on guard to take 
precautions for the child's safety.99 
D. The Dkposable Lighter and Swimming Pool Cases In Perspective 
Special qualities of the factual and legal issues raised by the swimming 
pool cases and the disposable butane lighter cases preclude their use as a 
basis for a just doctrine of products liability for children injured by everyday 
adult products. With regard to swimming pools, two considerations stand 
out. First, as suggested by Judge Bode in Keller v. Welles Department 
 tore,'" the hazards of immersion in a swimming pool of a child unable 
to swim are so apparent to adults, who respond routinely with precautionary 
measures, that it is hard to visualize a setting in which the risk of infant 
, 
drowning in a swimming pool could be characterized as latent. In contrast, 
the risks posed to a child by playful contact with items that may be found 
on any given day in a living room (a lighter) or in a garage (a gasoline 
container without a flame arrester) are, if not altogether latent, at least 
subtle. 
Additionally, and still regarding swimming pools, the risks inherent in 
diving are inseparable from those of drowning. The cultural memory, and 
consequent awareness, of these two risks reach back past recorded time. A 
swimming pool is sufficiently similar to other bodies of water that the 
Reporter's Notes to Restatement (Second) of Torts section 339 conclude that 
maintenance of an artificial body of water should not be considered an 
attractive nui~ance. '~' 
The conclusion of several courts that disposable butane lighters are open 
and obvious hazards, and not dangerous beyond the expectations of the 
ordinary consumer, is likewise not surprising in view of the societal 
acceptance, beginning with the safety match, of ambulatory fire worship. 
In terms of cultural acceptance, and a widespread perception of social utility, 
it is but a short step from safety matches to disposable lighters. 
The fact that lighters are often indiscriminately sold, in conjunction with 
the fact that their color and design often take the appearance of a toy, has 
of course contributed to both the rapid acceleration of injuries to children 
99. Keller v. Welles Dep't Store, 276 N.W.2d 319, 323 (Wis. Ct. App. 1979) (citing 
McWilliams v. Guzinski, 237 N.W.2d 437, 439 (Wis. 1976) (holding that "an insufficiently 
guarded swimming pool maintained in a residential area may be inherently dangerous to a 
child four years of age.")). 
100. Id. at 3 19. 
101. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS 5 339 cmt. j., illus. 6 (1965): 
A has on his land a small artificial pond in which, to A's knowledge, children of the 
neighborhood frequently trespass and swim. A takes no precautions of any kind. B, 
a boy ten years old who cannot swim, trespasses on A's land, enters the pond, and is 
drowned. A is not liable to B. 
Id. 
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and the outpouring of litigation against several manufacturers. Fortunately, 
the disposable lighter's hour in the limelight has nearly run, as the 
Consumer Product Safety Commission child resistance performance 
regulations affect all disposable and novelty lighters manufactured or 
imported on or after July 12, 1994.Io2 The injuries caused by these 
lighters will, in retrospect, seem a tragic but fleeting products liability 
anomaly-and a spasm in the final throes of the consumer expectations test 
under Restatement (Second) of Torts section 402A. 
IV. THE RETREAT OF THE "CONSUMER EXPECTATIONS" TEST 
AND THE "OPEN AND OBVIOUS" RULE 
A. The Consumer Expectations Test 
The "consumer expectations" test of defective condition''' and unrea- 
sonable danger'04 has been roundly critici~ed."~ Illustrative of its spe- 
cial harshness and illogic when applied to some infant injuries is Kelley v. 
Rival Manufacturing Co.,Io6 in which the parents of Jonathan Kelley, an 
11-month-old child, brought suit against Rival Manufacturing Co. after a 
slow cooker partially filled with heated beans fell upon him while he was 
in his walker.''' The federal trial court, applying Oklahoma law, rejected 
the plaintiffs claim, explaining its application of the consumer expectations 
test in the following manner: "In manufacturers products' liability actions 
involving minor plaintiffs, the question of whether a product is unreasonably 
dangerous is not premised on the viewpoint of the minor child, but rather 
is based upon .the contemplation of the parent consumer who purchased the 
produ~t. '~' '~ 
Reassuringly, however, courts and legislatures throughout the country 
have increasingly abandoned exclusive resort to a consumer expectations 
standard, and adopted, de jure or de facto, a risk-utility approach.'* 
102. See Safety Standard for Cigarette Lighters, 58 Fed. Reg. 37,557 (1993) (to be 
codified at 16 C.F.R. 5 1210). 
103. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS 8 402A cmt. g (1965) ("The rule stated in this 
section applies only where the product is, at the time it leaves the seller's hands, in a 
condition not contemplated by the ultimate consumer, which will be unreasonably dangerous 
to him."). 
104. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS 5 402A cmt. i (1965) ("The article sold must 
be dangerous to an extent beyond that which would be contemplated by the ordinary 
consumer who purchases it, with the ordinary knowledge common to the community as to 
its characteristics."). 
105. Council Draft IA, supra note 13, 4 2 cmt. c, at 137. 
106. 704 F. Supp. 1039 (W.D. Okla. 1989). 
107. Id. at 1041-42. 
108. Id. at 1043 (citing Bellote v. Zayre Corp., 531 F.2d 1 100, 1 103 (1st Cir. 1976)). 
109. In Sperry-New Holland v. Prestage, 617 So. 2d 248, 255 (Miss. 1993), the 
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Although several states doggedly retain the consumer expectations test for 
what constitutes an "unreasonably dangerous" c~ndition,"~ many of these 
have not precluded consideration of child resistancy as a design obligation 
in products the manufacturer knows are diverted to childhood play. 
As an example, Oklahoma has adopted the test for what constitutes an 
"unreasonably dangerous" product condition that requires a product be 
shown to be dangerous to an extent beyond what would be expected by an 
ordinary consumer."' The Oklahoma decision of Steele v. Daisy Manu- 
facturing Co.,l12 arising from accidental injuries to a child shot by a 
friend with an air rifle, came to the appellate court on appeal of the trial 
court's grant of summary judgment.Il3 In addition to their claim that the 
manufacturer had failed to provide adequate warnings on the air rifle, 
plaintiffs claimed that the rifle "failed to incorporate technologically feasible 
safeguards to prevent accidental sh~otings.""~ The appellate court noted 
that at trial evidence on the design claim included the following risk-utility 
testimony: 
Plaintiffs submitted deposition testimony of  Daisy's own engineer, as well 
as their own experts, who stated that it would have been economically 
feasible to have incorporated an automatic trigger safety device on the 
rifle. He stated accidental discharge was a risk associated with a high 
velocity gun. A former Daisy engineer testified he had presented to the 
company the possibility of an automatic trigger safety being used. He  
believed it should be used. [Another plaintiffs expert] testified it was his 
opinion an air gun with the power of  the Daisy 880 that was intended to 
be used by youth should be equipped with an automatic safety. He also 
Mississippi Supreme Court turned away from the consumer expectation rationale to adopt a 
risk-utility theory of defect and recovery, commenting that "[a]round the country, the test 
generally employed to determine liability for products defects is the 'risk-utility' test . . . ." 
See also Council Draft 1 A, supra note 13, .$ 101 cmt. g, at 137 ("An overwhelming 
majority of American jurisdictions rely on risk-utility balancing in design cases. They may 
. . 1 talk as though consumer expectations operate independent of notions of reasonableness, 
but in fact they rely on risk-utility balancing in determining whether designs 'a defective 
or defendants have failed adequately to warn."); cf: James A. Henderson Jr., Judicial Review 
of Manufacturers' Conscious Design Choices: The Limits of Adjudication, 73 COLUM. L. 
REV. 1531 (1973), in which the author argues, among other things, the preferability of 
application of the consumer expectations test, as appropriately inhibiting judicial evaluation 
of designs themselves. 
110. For example, in the recent Nebraska decision, Kudlacek v. FIAT, 509 N.W.2d 
603, 610 (Neb. 1994), the court states: '"Unreasonably dangerous' means that the product 
has a propensity for causing physical harm beyond that which would be contemplated by the 
ordinary user or consumer who purchases it, with the ordinary knowledge common to the 
foreseeable class of users as to its characteristics." (citations omitted). 
11 1. Woods v. Fruehauf Trailer Corp., 765 P.2d 770, 774 (Okla. 1988). 
112. 743 P.2d 1107 (Okla. Ct. App. 1987). 
113. Id. 
114. Id. at 1108. 
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criticized the gun because the safety could not be activated until the gun 
was cocked. l 5  
As the discussion later in this Article reveals, the authors of the 
Restatement (Third) of Torts: Products Liability have recognized the justice 
and rationality of admitting risk-utility analysis in the adjudication of design 
defect cases, and have proposed that a consumer's reasonable expectations 
of a product's safety be only one of multiple factors considered in 
evaluating a product's reasonable safety.lI6 
B. The Open and Obvious Rule 
It is accepted that a manufacturer's duty to warn of risks is not confined 
to risks from intended uses of the product, but extends as well to foreseeable 
misuses. For example, in Trivino v. Jamesway Corp.,I1' which involved 
the ignition of a child's Halloween costume crafted from cosmetic cotton- 
rayon puffs glued to a pajama costume exterior, the court stated: "While we 
agree that plaintiffs use of the cotton puffs was a misuse in the sense that 
it was outside the scope of the apparent purpose for which the puffs were 
manufactured, we cannot agree that plaintiffs misuse was unforeseeable as 
a matter of law.""8 
Particularly where risks to children are foreseeable, the adequacy of a 
warning has generally been held to be a question of fact for the jury. 
Consider the Arizona appellate opinion in Shaw v. Peter~en,"~ a parents' 
suit against a swimming pool owner arising from the injuries of a 19-month- 
old child. The court states correctly that "there may be a duty to take 
precautions with respect to those of tender years which would not be 
necessary in the case of adults."'20 A manufacturer's duty, the court 
115. Id. at 1109. 
116. Council Draft lA, supra note 13, 8 2, Reporters' Note to cmt. c, at 137, 139. 
An overwhelming majority of American jurisdictions rely on risk-utility balancing in 
design cases. They may, from time to time, talk as though consumer expectations 
operate independent by notions of reasonableness, but in fact they rely on risk-utility 
balancing in determining whether designs are defective or defendants have failed 
adequately to warn. 
. . . .  
Scholarly commentary agrees overwhelmingly with the above-cited decisions and the 
risk-utility approach adopted therein. See, e.g., MADDEN, [supra note 24, at] 297 ("In 
applying 5 402A to an action based on defective product design, the crucial question is 
whether the product is unreasonably dangerous as designed, taking into consideration 
the utility of the product and the risk involved in its use.''). 
117. 539 N.Y.S.2d 123 (N.Y. App. Div. 1989). 
118. Id. at 124. 
1 19. 821 P.2d 220 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1991). 
120. Id. at 222 (quoting Shannon v. Butler Homes, Inc., 428 P.2d 990, 995 (Ariz. 
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concluded, may include the du$ to "conside[r] the capacity of the child to 
appreciate the full extent of risk invol~ed." '~~ 
Also noteworthy in this connection are the statements in Williams v. 
Beechnut Nutrition Corp.122 that "the inherent danger posed by a [baby 
bottle] glass container, while obvious to an adult, is not cognizable by a 
[three-year-old] child;" and Keller v. Welles Department Store,lz3 a suit 
arising. from burn injury caused by juvenile playing with a gasoline can, 
where the court was "unable to conclude, as a matter of law, that the 
absence of a child-proof cap was an obvious as opposed to a latent 
condition.'"24 
The clear trend of national products liability authority favors abandon- 
ment of exclusive resort to the open and obvious defense in design 
cases.I2' For example, in Bean v. BIC Corp.,lZ6 the Alabama Supreme 
Court held that as the open and obvious issue related to the manufacturer's 
affirmative defenses of assumption of the risk, the product's defectiveness, 
and causation, it was necessary to submit it to the In Bean, 
plaintiffs maintained that the spare warning "keep out of the reach of 
children" was inadequate.Iz8 In the court's words: 
[Tlhe Beans argue that the warnings were inadequate because they (1) 
failed to warn about the attractiveness of lighters to small children, (2) 
failed to warn that small children could easily operate the lighters, and (3) 
failed to warn of the serious danger of fires started by small children 
playing with lighters. The Beans argue that BIC failed to show the 
absence of a genuine issue of material fact to be determined by the jury. 
We agree.Iz9 
1967) (en banc)). 
121. Id. at 222-23 (citations omitted). The court stated further: "The characteristics 
of children are proper matters for consideration in determining what is ordinary care with 
respect to them, and there may be a duty to take precautions with respect to those of tender 
years which would not be necessary in the case of adults[,]" that may create a duty to 
"conside[r] the ability of the child to appreciate the risk involved." Id. at 223. 
122. 229 Cal. Rptr. 605, 607 (Cal. Ct. App. 1986). 
123. 276 N.W.2d 3 19 (Wis. Ct. App. 1978). 
124. Id. at 323. 
125. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODUCTS LIABILITY, at 19 (Council Draft No. 
1, 1993) [hereinafter Council Draft 11. 
126. 597 So. 2d 1350 (Ala. 1992). See supra notes 89-93 and accompanying text. 
127. 597 So. 2d at 1353. 
128. Id. 
129. Id. Much of the conflicting authority is readily distinguishable. For example, 
in Adarns v. Perry Furniture Co., 497 N.W.2d 514 (Mich. Ct. App. 1993), an intermediate 
appellate opinion, the issue on review was whether a lighter manufacturer had a duty to make 
the lighter "childproof." In contrast, the question asked by this Article is whether the 
manufacturer has a design duty to make the product child-resistant. 
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C. The Restatement (Third) of Torts: Products Liability 
1. Generally 
In May of 1992, the American Law Institute's Council decided to begin 
a Restatement (Third) of Torts and to make its first initiative a Restatement 
of Products Liability. On April 20, 1993, the Reporters for this project, 
Professors Aaron D. Twerski of Brooklyn Law School, and James A. 
Henderson Jr. of Cornell Law School, published their "Preliminary Draft 
Number No. 1" of the products liability component.130 After a late spring 
and summer of energetic exchange with lawyers, jurists, and teachers both 
within the Institute and beyond, the Reporters published "Council Draft No. 
1-131 for presentation to the sixty-one-member ALI ~ounci l . '~*  The 
subjects of Council Draft No. 1 were "Product Defectiveness," "Causation," 
and "Affirmative Defenses." On January 4, 1994 the Reporters issued their 
Council Draft lA, which was reviewed by the Council March 4, 1994.133 
2. Defective Design 
As pertinent to the issue of children injured in the use of products 
intended for adults, section 101 of the Preliminary Draft proposed that a 
case for design defect liability would be established "if the foreseeable risks 
of harm presented by the product could have been reduced by the adoption 
of a reasonable, safer design."'34 The Council Draft was changed to read, 
"if the foreseeable risks of harm presented by the product could have been 
reduced by the adoption of a reasonable, alternative design."135 Explain- 
130. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODUCTS LIABILITY (Preliminary Draft No. 
1, 1993) [hereinafter Preliminary Draft 11. 
13 1. See Council Draft 1, supra note 125. 
132. Id. This draft of the products liability Restatement was preceded by a Preliminary 
Draft on April 20, 1993. It is worthwhile describing the role that both a Preliminary Draft 
and a Council Draft play in the maturation of an eventual Restatement of the Law. The 
preliminary draft of a potential Restatement regarding any subject is, in every sense, 
preliminary. It represents the work, synthesis, and approach of its authors, and is exclusively 
the work of the Reporters. It is the first of many stages of an eventual Restatement. 
In the months following the April 1993 draft's distribution, the Reporters and the ALI 
undertook a commendable effort to invite and consider views of a wide spectrum of the 
practicing bar, law professors and members of the judiciary. On the basis of these 
comments, Professors Henderson and Twerski prepared Council Draft No. 1. 
133. Council Draft 1 A, supra note 13. A Tentative Draft that incorporated final 
Council wishes was submitted to the May, 1994 ALI Meeting. At this writing, consideration 
is scheduled for a Council Draft No. 2. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODUCTS 
LIABILITY (Council Draft No. 2, 1994). 
134. Preliminary Draft 1, supra note 130, at 7.. 
135. Council Draft 1, supra note 125, at 1. 
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ing the revision, the Reporters stated that "reasonable alternative design" is 
the phrase most frequently used by the courts,136 and that the use of the 
term "safer" would be redundant, for "if the alternative design reduces the 
foreseeable risks of the harm posed by the product, it is by definition 
'~afer.""~' Finally, the Reporters noted that "the design offered by the 
plaintiff must be a 'reasonable alternative' to the design in que~tion."'~~ 
Although "[tlhe proffered design may be safer[, it] . . . may not be a 
'reasonable alternative. ,93139 
The Reporters emphasized that the consumer expectations test is 
"explicitly abandoned as an independent test 'for determining defect."""' 
In their words, the test for design defect properly employs "a risk-utility 
balancing to determine defectiveness in the context of design."l4l This 
test is "the, standard for judging the defectiveness of product designs" and 
obligates the "plaintiff [to] prove that the seller or a predecessor in the 
distributive chain failed to adopt a reasonable alternative design that would, 
at acceptable cost, have reduced the foreseeable risks of harm posed by the 
A risk-utility balancing test is then unmistakably the Restatement's test 
for determining the reasonableness of a "reasonable alternative design." 
Council Draft No. 1 discusses more hlly the restrictions of "reasonable 
alternative design" than had the Preliminary Draft, emphasizing that any 
136. Id. at i, 78 (quoting Beech v. Outboard Marine Corp., 584 So. 2d 447,450 (Ala. 
1991) ("In order to prove defectiveness, the plaintiff must prove that a safer, practical 
alternative design was available to the manufacturer at the time it manufactured the 
[product]") (citations omitted); Hull v. Eaton Corp., 825 F.2d 448, 454 (D.C. Cir. 1987) 
("We believe that the District of Columbia would follow the riswutility balancing test 
referred to by the Maryland courts. Under that test a manufacturer is strictly liable for 
damage caused by his product if there was a feasible way to design a safer product and an 
ordinary consumer would conclude that the manufacturer ought to have used that alternative 
design.")). 
137. Council Draft 1, supra note 125, at i. 
138. Id. 
139. Id. at ii. See id. 8 101 cmt. h ("Design defect: Reasonable Alternative Design"). 
140. Council Draft 1, supra note 125, at 28. However, the Reporters state that "the 
nature and strength of consumer expectations," inter alia, may be considered when deciding 
the reasonableness of a product design. Id. at 22. 
141. Id. at 16-17, 54 cmt. g (citing Hull v. Eaton Corp., 825 F.2d 448 (D.C. Cir. 
1987); Phipps v. General Motors Corp., 363 A.2d 955 (Md. 1976); Radiation Technology, 
Inc. v. Ware Constr. Co., 445 So. 2d 329 (Fla. 1983); Back v. Wickes Corp., 378 N.E.2d 964 
(Mass. 1978); Voss v. Black & Decker Mfg. Co., 450 N.E.2d 204 (N.Y. 1983)). 
142. Council Draft 1, supra note 125, at 16. The Reporters add that "[s]cholarly 
commentary agrees overwhelmingly with . . . the risk utility approach." Id. See, e.g., 
MADDEN, supra note 24, at 297, quoted in Council Draft 1, supra note 125, at 57 ("In 
applying [section] 402A to an action based on defective product design, the crucial question 
is whether the product is unreasonably dangerous as designed, taking into consideration 
utility of the product and the risk involved in its use.''). 
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proposed alternative design must consider the cost of designing the 
alternative and whether an alternative design would provide greater overall 
safety,143 
Directly germane to the proof burden of many infant injury claims, the 
Reporters proposed that liability standards reject the "open and obvious" or 
"patent danger" rule as a total bar to a design defect claim, relegating 
"obviousness" to the role of "one factor among many to consider as to 
whether a product design meets risk-utility norms.""@ 
In contrast,. the Reporters state that there is no duty to warn about 
obvious dangers. Explaining the compatibility of a rule that obviousness is 
no automatic bar to a design defect claim with one that preserves it as an 
excuse from informational obligations, Professors Henderson and Twerski 
cite their own earlier commentary to this effect: 
[Tlhe argument for abandoning the patent danger rule in warning cases, 
simply because the rule has been abandoned in design cases, makes no 
sense. In a design case, the obviousness of the danger does not necessarily 
preclude the possibility that an alternative design could reduce the risk 
cost-effectively. By contrast, assuming that some risks are patently 
obvious, the obviousness of a product-related risk invariably serves the 
same function as a warning that the risk is present. Thus nothing is to be 
143. See generally Council Draft 1, supra note 125, $ 101 cmt. h, at 77. The 
Reporters continue by explaining: "It is not sufficient that the alternative design would have 
reduced or prevented the harm suffered by the plaintiff if it would also introduce into the 
product other dangers of equal or greater magnitude. Such an alternative design could not 
be considered to be reasonable." Id. at 22. The Reporters cite, inter alia, Husky Indus., Inc. 
v. Black, 434 So. 2d 988 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1983), for the proposition that after 
consideration of the monetary and nonrnonetary costs, a manufacturer may have "no 
obligation to provide the safest design available or provide for the ultimate in safety." 
Council Draft 1, supra note 125, at 90. 
Cost and consumer preference may be considered as well. An alternative design may 
provide greater safety, "but only by substantially increasing the monetary cost of the product 
or by significantly reducing its attractiveness to consumers by decreasing the benefits of use 
and consumption." Id. at 2 1. 
144. council Draft 1, supra note 125, at 69. A majority of the courts have rejected 
the "open and obvious" or "patent danger" rule. Id., cmt. g, at 69-70, (citing Byrns v. 
Riddel, Inc., 550 P.2d 1065, 1068 (Ariz. 1976); Auburn Mach. Works Co. v. Jones, 366 So. 
2d 1167, 1169 (Fla. 1979); Pike v. Frank G. Hough Co., 467 P.2d 229 (Cal. 1970); Besse 
v. Deere & Co., 604 N.E.2d 998 (Ill. App. Ct. 1992), appeal denied, 612 N.E.2d 51 1 (1993); 
Micallef v. Miehle Co., 348 N.E.2d 571 (N.Y. 1976)). However, the obviousness of the 
danger may be one factor in deciding whether a product is defectively designed. Council 
Draft 1, supra note 125, at 69,71. See also Dreisonstok v. Volkswagenwerk, A.G., 489 F.2d 
1066, 1075-76 (4th Cir. 1974) (The obviousness of the risk of injury in a microbus without 
front-end engine protection was an important factor in directing verdict for defendant on 
design defect.). 
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gained by adding a warning of the danger already telegraphed by the 
product itself.'45 
3. Informational Defects (Instructions and Warnings) 
Section 101(b)(3) of Council Draft No. 1 adopts a reasonableness test 
in judging the adequacy of warnings similar to that of the reasonableness 
test of section 101(b)(2) for design defects.'46 This Draft emphasizes the 
difficulty of applying this standard in the context of failure to instruct or 
warn, recognizing, inter alia, that the effectiveness of a warning may be 
reduced by (1) excessive warnings, increasing the likelihood that they are 
ignored; (2) an inappropriate degree of intensity with which the warnings are 
transmitted; or (3) the inclusion of "trivial or far-fetched ri~ks."'~' 
Liability for design defect and failure to warn claims will attach only 
where the product has been put to a reasonably foreseeable use. Council 
Draft No. 1 made one substantive change here from the Preliminary Draft 
treatment. The Preliminary Draft took the position that if the use of a 
product (excluding prescription drugs and toxic products) is a foreseeable 
one, then the manufacturer is charged with the knowledge of risks arising 
therefrom. Recognizing that imputing knowledge in all cases of harm 
resulting from defendant's product has little judicial and scholarly sup- 
port,14' Council Draft No. 1 places upon plaintiff the burden of showing 
that the risks of harm were known or should have been known at the time 
of man~facture . '~~ However, the Reporters make an exception in the case 
of mechanical products, providing that if plaintiff establishes that a 
mechanical product was put to a reasonably foreseeable use, it is not 
necessary for the plaintiff to prove that the seller knew or should have 
known of the risks that would arise from such foreseeable use."' 
145. James A. Henderson Jr. & Aaron D. Twerski, Doctrinal Collapse in Products 
Liability: The Empty Shell of Failure to Warn, 65 N.Y.U. L: REV. 265,282 (1990). See also 
Council Draft 1, supra note 125, at 98. 
146. See Council Draft 1, supra note 125, at 1. 
147. Id. at 28-29. The Reporters add: "Striking the appropriate balance is essential." 
Id. at 29. 
148. Id. at 105. The Reporters cite the observation of Dean John Wade: "I think there 
is no longer any particular value in using the assumed-knowledge language." Id. at 104-05 
(citing John W. Wade, On the Efect of Product Liability of Knowledge Unavailable Prior 
to Marketing, 58 N.Y.U. L. REV. 734, 764 (1983)). 
149. Id. at 106. 
150. Id. at 101. The Reporters explain: "We see no good reason to burden plaintiffs 
with proving the foreseeability of risks arising from foreseeable uses of mechanical products. 
The reality is that, almost by definition, once the use [of a mechanical product] is 
foreseeable, the risks which attend such use are foreseeable." Id. 
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D. For Products Attractive to or Normally Accessible to Children, 
Considerations of Child Resistancy Are Properly 
a Part of the Manufacturer's Design Obligation. 
The question presented by this Article is: Where a consumer product is 
(1) by nature attractive to children and (2) made for use in or near house- 
hold living quarters, does the manufacturer have a duty to adopt reasonable 
design alternatives to lessen the likelihood of injurious childhood use? The 
doctrinal evaluation of a manufacturer's design duties regarding hazards to 
children from use of its product should not be distracted by description of 
the issue as one of the presence or absence of a duty to "childproof' a 
product. Apart from a small number of infant items, which are regulated for 
the most part by the Consumer Product Safety Commission, there is no duty 
to make a "childproof' product any more than there is a duty to make a 
"foolproof' product. 
While some courts reviewing claims brought on behalf of children 
injured by products intended for adults have rejected "foreseeability" as the 
primary duty-determining factor,I5' many recent decisions nevertheless 
find such a foreseeability-based duty. Recall that in Campbell v. BIC 
C ~ r p . , " ~  a suit brought on behalf of a six-year-old for bum injuries 
suffered after playing with a disposable butane lighter, the New York trial 
court stated: "[A] manufacturer also has the duty to design its product so 
that it avoids an unreasonable risk of harm when it is being used for an 
unintended but foreseeable use."'53 
Similarly, in Todd v. Societe BIC,"~ also involving a BIC lighter, the 
Court of Appeals, applying Illinois law providing for a "consumer 
contemplation" test, reversed the trial court's grant of summary judgment, 
noting that Illinois' consumer contemplation standard permits weighing "the 
benefits of the challenged design" against "the risk of danger inherent in 
151. E.g., Kirk v. Hanes Corp., 16 F.3d 705 (6th Cir. 1994) (a disposable butane 
lighter case). In Kirk the Sixth Circuit stated, "In the present case, the district court held, 
as a matter of law, that even though 'injuries due to unsupervised children playing with the 
lighter may be foreseeable, such risks are not unreasonable.' Therefore, the district court 
concluded, Bic's failure to 'child-proof its lighters was not actionable under Michigan law. 
We agree." Id. at 707 (citations omitted). 
152. 586 N.Y.S.2d 871 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1992). 
153. Id. at 873 (dismissed on statute of limitations grounds) (citations omitted): 
Requiring reasonable design measures to avoid foreseeable injury to children is indicated 
here where the foreseeable risks are those of serious injury or death to numerous 
children each year, while the burden is that of adopting a relatively simple child 
resistant design-a precautionary measure that Appellant concedes was feasible at the 
time of Appellee's accident. 
Id. 
154. 991 F.2d 1334, 1340 (7th Cir. 1993). 
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such desigr~.""~ The court explained, "The district court should have 
permitted a jury to consider children, as possible foreseeable users, under the 
consumer contemplation te~t.""~ 
A particularly effective invocation of the standard of reasonable 
foreseeability is found in the Missouri Appellate opinion in Strothkamp v. 
Chesebrough-Pond's, ~nc.,"' in which plaintiffs-appellants appealed the 
trial court's judgment n.0.v. following an award of actual and punitive 
damages to a five-year-old who severely injured his ear using appellee's Q- 
Tips brand cottod swabs. Reversing in part, and remanding for a new trial 
on actual damages, the court explained: 
Where the prudent manufacturer would foresee that a condition or 
propensity of the product is likely not to be fully known and appreciated 
by those using it, . . . the duty of care requires a warning. 
. . . .  
- - 
The duty to provide safety features similarly focuses on foreseeability 
. . . [and depends upon] whether Chesebrough should anticipate that failing 
to provide child resistant packaging would cause harm to a child. 
There was substantial evidence to support finding a duty to utilize 
child resistant packaging.ls8 
E. The Attributes of a Standard of Reasonable Foreseeability of Risk 
With regard to children injured by contact with products intended for 
adults, the incongruity between modem products liability cases determined 
under section 402A and those tried on a negligence count is nowhere more 
clearly revealed than in Griggs v. BIC Corp.,lS9 a strict liability and 
negligence suit brought on behalf of an 1 1-month-old child injured when his 
three-year-old stepbrother ignited his bedding with defendant's lighter. 
Among other factual allegations summoned in support of the parent's claim 
that the manufacturer had a duty to "child-proof' such a product, the trial 
court noted: 
(1) annually there has been a high incidence of child related fires which 
result from playing with butane lighters; (2) children are attracted to the 
lighters because they are small and colorful; (3) children are able to 
produce a flame with the lighters; and (4) it is feasible and inexpensive to 
155. Id. at 1338. 
156. Id. at 1340. 
157. No. 60645, 1993 WL 79239 (Mo. Ct. App. March 23, 1993). 
158. Id. at * 5  (citations omitted). See also Steele v. Daisy Mfg. Co., 743 P.2d 1107 
(Okla. Ct. App. 1987) (countenancing expert testimony as to the economic feasibility of an 
automatic trigger safety in a suit arising from accidental injuries to a child shot by a friend 
with an air rifle). 
159. 98 1 F.2d 1429 (3d Cir.), affg in part and rev 'g in part 786 F. Supp. 1203 (M.D. 
Pa. 1992). 
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manufacture lighters designed with child-proof safety devices which would 
not impede use by adults.16" 
The trial judge nevertheless granted the manufacturer's motion for summary 
judgment, observing that "a product is capable of causing injury when in the 
hands of an unsupervised child does not, of itself, render the product 
defective or unreasonably danger~us."'~' 
Affirming as to summary judgment on the strict liability count, the Third 
Circuit reversed and remanded the trial court's entry of judgment on 
plaintiffs negligence count. Conceding that foreseeability plays no proper 
role in a strict liability design claim as interpreted by Pennsylvania courts, 
the appellate court found that in preserving the claim of negligent design, 
the Pennsylvania Supreme Court had deliberately retained a preserve for 
issues of foreseeability through the agency of risk-utility analysis. This 
found, the Third Circuit continued: 
The classic model for analyzing this aspect of negligence law is the 
risk-utility form of analysis, which balances "the risk, in the light of the 
social value of the interest threatened, and the probability and extent of the 
harm, against the value of the interest which the actor is seeking to protect 
and the expedience of the course pursued."'62 
Applying this rubric to the facts of record, the court referenced the 1988 
Consumer Product Safety Commission Advance Notice of Proposed 
Rulemaking concerning disposable lighters,'63 which catalogued the 
hundreds of persons injured each year in fires started by children playing 
with lighters, and found that the Commission's Notice constituted a showing 
of the gravity of the harm, as well as the social value of an alternative 
design in terms of enhanced safety for persons and their property. "These 
statistics suggest further," the court continued, "that the likelihood of the 
occurrence of harm is sufficiently substantial to generate a duty of 
precaution . . . . Weighing further the risk-utility inquiry into "the 
social value of the interest which the actor is seeking to ad~ance,"'~' the 
court noted cryptically that "[tlhe only interest BIC can be seeking to 
advance by not child-proofing its lighter is one of cost and its own 
economic Reversing and remanding on the count of negligent 
160. Griggs, 786 F. Supp. at 1204. 
161. Id. 
162. 981 F.2d at 1435-36. 
163. 53 Fed. Reg. 6833 (1988). 
164. 981 F.2d at 1436. 
165. Id. ((quoting W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF 
TORTS 8 3 1, at 171 (5th ed. 1984)). 
166. Id. The court continued: 
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design, the Third Circuit sent a clear signal to the trial court with these 
words: 
On balance, the high social value placed on the safety of people and 
property threatened by childplay fires, the high gravity of risk, the 
considerable probability of risk, and the likelihood of a reasonably 
available alternative may outweigh BIC's interest in producing its lighters 
" without childproofing features. In such circumstances, the risk of omission 
would be unrea~onable.'~' 
In Keller, the Wisconsin appellate court created a "safe as was 
reasonably possible" standard for gauging a manufacturer's design 
obligations.'68 In that suit, the court heard the appeal of a products suit 
brought following the injury of a two-year-old boy who was badly burned 
after playing with a filled gasoline container near the basement gas furnace 
and hot water heater. The defendants cited Vincer v. Esther Williams All- 
Aluminum Swimming Pool C O . , ' ~ ~  in which a young boy was denied 
recovery for injuries following access to a swimming pool equipped with a 
retractable ladder that had'been left in the down position. The court in 
Keller saw the gasoline can scenario as distinguishable, reasoning that while 
"the Vincer court concluded that the swimming pool could not have been 
defective for failure to have the suggested gate because it had a retractable 
ladder which rendered the pool 'as safe as it possibly could be,""70 the 
gasoline can played with by the two toddlers in Keller "was not as safe as 
was reasonably possible since the cap was not designed in such a way as to 
prevent young children from removing it."l7' 
Recognizing the role that foreseeability properly plays in design defect 
claims, the appeals court explained the risk-utility approach that it favored: 
Equipping the gasoline can with a child-proof cap would have rendered the 
can substantially safer and entailed only a nominal additional cost. The 
practical value of such a cap may readily be seen since gasoline cans, 
while not intended to be used by children unable to appreciate the attendant 
A manufacturer's economic health is undeniably valuable to society for many reasons, 
including the bearing it has on the employment of workers, the payment of taxes, and 
the availability of a socially useful product. Because BIC has also conceded the 
feasibility of childproofing the lighter for purposes of its summary judgment motion, it 
presumably had economic alternatives, unless childproofing the lighter would impair the 
lighter's usefulness or make it too expensive to maintain its marketability. 
Id. 
167. Id. at 1437. 
168. 276 N.W.2d 319, 322 (Wis. Ct. App. 1979). 
169. 230 N.W.2d 794 (Wis. 1975). 
170. 276 N.W.2d at 322 (quoting Vincer, 230 N.W.2d at 798). 
171. Id. 
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dangers of gasoline, are customarily stored in places accessible to ~hi1dren.I~~ 
The operation of a standard of reasonable foreseeability for design or 
warning claims arising from childhood injuries by adult products can also 
be seen clearly through the lens of three decisions: (1) the Fourth Circuit 
opinion in Spruill v. Boyle-Midway, ~ n c . ; ' ~ ~  (2) the Maryland Court of 
Appeals decision in Moran v. Faberge, ~ n c ; ' ~ ~  and (3) the Eighth Circuit 
Court of Appeals holding in Laney v. Coleman Co."' 
In Spruill, where a fourteen-month-old child died after ingesting cherry- 
red furniture polish, the court, finding in favor of plaintiffs failure to warn 
claim, stated that the manufacturer "must also be expected to anticipate the 
environment which is normal for the use of his product and where, as here, 
that environment is the home, he must anticipate the reasonably foreseeable 
risks of the use of his product in such an en~ironment."'~~ 
In Moran, plaintiffs, two teenagers playing in a basement family room 
hypothesized that a candle could be made "scented" by adding drops of 
Faberge's Tigress c01ogne.l~~ As one did so, the resulting "burst of fire" 
badly burned the other. Stating that the litigation before it cast the question 
"[Wlhen does the responsibility to warn arise?,"'78 the Maryland Court of 
Appeals answered the question in the following manner: 
[W]e think that in the products liability domain a duty to warn is imposed 
on a manufacturer if the item it produces has an inherent and hidden 
danger about which the producer knows, or should know, could be a 
substantial factor in bringing injury to an individual or his property when 
the manufacturer's product comes near to or in contact with the elements 
which are present normally in the environment where the product can 
reasonably be expected to be brought or used.'79 
The court explained that it was not holding that Faberge should have 
foreseen that a teenager would pour Faberge over a source of ignition. 
Rather, "it was only necessary that it be foreseeable to the producer that its 
product, while in its normal environment, might be brought near a catalyst, 
likely to be found in that environment, which can untie the chattel's inherent 
danger."Ig0 
172. Id. 
173. 308 F.2d 79 (4th Cir. 1962). 
174. 332 A.2d 1 1  (Md. 1975). 
175. 758 F.2d 1299 (8th Cir. 1985). 
176. 308 F.2d at 83-84. 
177. 332 A.2d at 13. 
178. Id. at 15. 
179. Id. at 20 (citations omitted). 
180. Id. The court described the following and more prosaic scenario in which an 
alcohol-based cologne might ignite: 
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In Laney, plaintiffs recovered a large compensatory award from The 
Coleman Company following an accident in which several children used a 
fuel can distributed by defendant to fuel a fire they had started in a pile of 
leaves.lgl The fire followed the fuel stream back to the can and, in what 
is known as a "flashback," caused an explosion and a splattering of the 
ignited fuel.lg2 
In their claim for design defect under Restatement (Second) of Torts 
section 402A, the plaintiffs' principle contention was that the fuel can was 
defective for want of a "flashback arrester," a device that could be placed 
at the end of a fuel can nozzle to prevent reintroduction of flame into the 
can.lg3 At trial, experts testified that it would cost between one-and-one- 
half cents to fifty cents, plus installation cost, to install the device on each 
can.lS4 Turning to Coleman's argument that recovery should be barred 
because the manufacturer "did not reasonably anticipate that its fuel can 
would be used by children or that its fuel can would be used near a 
fire,""' the Eighth Circuit responded initially that "[tlhe issue is not what 
use Coleman intended for its product but what use of the product objectively 
was f~reseeable."'~~ Reviewing the record, the court concluded: 
The jury apparently concluded that it was reasonably foreseeable to 
Coleman that its fuel cans would fall into the hands of children and would 
be used near sources of heat. Neither Coleman's arguments nor our review 
of the record convinces us that this conclusion by the jury should be 
reversed as a matter of law.'*' 
A manufacturer may be relieved of responsibility for plaintiffs injury 
only where plaintiffs conduct is so unforeseeable as to constitute the sole 
legal cause of his injuries. The courts' that have permitted these children's 
products liability claims to go before a jury have commonly reiterated that 
foreseeability does not require that the particular circumstances of an 
accident be foreseeable, but rather that an accident of the type that occurred 
was objectively reasonable to expect.'88 For example, in Kriz v. 
For example, while seated at a dressing table, a woman might strike a match to light a 
cigarette close enough to the top of the open cologne bottle so as to cause an explosion, 
or that while seated in a similar manner she might turn suddenly and accidentally bump 
the bottle of  cologne with her elbow, splashing some cologne on a burning candle 
placed on the vanity. 
Id. 
181. Laney, 758 F.2d at 1301 & n. I .  
182. Id. at 1301. 
183. Id. at 1301 & n.1. 
184. Id. 
185. Id. at 1302. 
186. Id. 
187. Id. (footnote omitted). 
188. E.g., Yassin v. Certified Grocers, 502 N.E.2d 315 (Ill. App. Ct. 1986) (child's 
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 churn,'*^ a suit brought by a swimmer rendered a paraplegic after a head 
first slide down a pool slide into an above-ground pool, the New York Court 
of Appeals held that the swimmer's conduct in sliding into pool of unknown 
depth was not an unforeseeable superseding cause.lgO 
The evidence in Kriz enjoyed striking parallels with that coming before 
many courts hearing disposable butane lighter claims. The Kriz court noted 
that the above-ground pool industry was well aware of the common use of 
head-first belly  dive^,'^' just as the mini-lighter industry has known of the 
routine diversion of its lighters to children. The plaintiff's use of the slide, 
sliding into the pool, was the expected use, just as the ignition of the butane 
lighter by children constitutes the lighter's expected use. Lastly, the above- 
ground pool industry's knowledge of CPSC-required labels cautioning 
against headfirst sliding permitted the inference of industry knowledge of the 
prevalence of this practice,lg2 just as the disposable butane lighter 
industry's development of a warning label and its design, albeit tardy, of a 
genuinely child resistant lighter evinces its knowledge, and the manifest 
foreseeability of, childhood use of the product. Thus, the adequacy of a 
warning presents a question of fact for the jury, particularly where risks to 
children are foreseeable. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
In the development of products liability law, the failure to reconcile 
childhood status with principles of fairness and corrective justice has been 
particularly telling. The weight of products liability doctrine has been 
virtually Edwardian in its reluctance to recognize children's rights and 
special vulnerabilities. More than any other constituency, children injured 
by products intended for adult use have been disserved by often exclusive, 
and always mechanistic, application of the consumer expectations standard. 
It is only tardily that products liability law has moved to recognize the 
special concerns of childhood injuries caused by use of adult products. In 
the instances of the disposable butane lighter litigation and the swimming 
pool litigation, the forthcoming elimination of the former risk193 and the 
cultural armistice with the latter make the decisions in these lawsuits ill- 
suited as root-stock for general approaches to products liability for other 
adult products that result in harm to children. 
At this time, absent favorable precedent in a plaintiff's jurisdiction under 
Restatement (Second) of Torts section 402A on comparable facts, the 
injury caused by placing hand in grocery store meat tenderizer). 
189. 549 N.E.2d 1 155 (N.Y. 1989). 
190. Id. at 1 160. 
191. Id. 
192. Id. 
193. Consumer Product Safety Commission Final Rule, 16 C.F.R. 5 1210 (1993). 
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claimant may be best served by taking one step forward and two steps back. 
By one step forward is meant that the Restatement (Third) of Torts: 
Products Liability may be anticipated to provide theories of recovery and 
systems of proof and defense that neutralize most of the harsh effects of the 
consumer expectations test and the open and obvious defense. In their stead 
the Reporters promote exclusive resort to a risk-utility evaluation, fortified 
by concepts of reasonable foreseeability, which increases the likelihood of 
liability for manufacturers who put into household use products nominally 
intended for adults, but which foreseeably invite misadventure with children. 
By two steps back it is meant that from the Restatement of Products 
Liability, moving two steps back through Restatement (Second) of Torts 
section 402A to the venerable causes of action of negligent failure to warn 
and negligent failure to design a reasonably safe product, plaintiffs' counsel 
again finds a harbor safe from the consumer expectations test and the open 
and obvious defense.'94 
194. The Third Circuit decision in Griggs makes it clear that even where a strict 
products liability claim that a product should be made childproof fails in strict products 
liability, it may succeed where injuries to children were foreseeable and a safer alternative 
design was feasible. Griggs v. BIC Corp., 981 F.2d 1429 (3d Cir. 1992). 
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